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Nonsovereign Racecraft: How Colonialism, Debt, and
Disaster are Transforming Puerto Rican Racial Subjectivities
Isar Godreau and Yarimar Bonilla
ABSTRACT Using the concept of “racecraft” to describe the state production of racial subjectivities, we argue
that this process has been increasingly compromised in Puerto Rico by a lack of sovereignty and by the current
socioeconomic crisis. We argue that the state-sponsored idea that Puerto Rican white and mixed-race identities
operate separately from the US racial framework is receding. Based on the unconventional use of an open-ended
question for racial identification in a survey administered to over one thousand Puerto Ricans, we found: a reluctance
to identify racially, an awareness of a normative “whiteness” that excludes Puerto Ricans, and a tendency to embrace
US federal categories such as “Hispanic” and “Latino.” We interpret these results as evidence of a Puerto Rican racial
state in decline, arguing that the island’s debt crisis and compounding disasters have not only eroded the political
and economic realms of statecraft but the racial one as well. [census, colonialism, race, identity, statecraft, racial
state, Puerto Rico]
RESUMEN Usamos racecraft para describir la producción de subjetividades raciales por parte del estado, argu-
mentando que este proceso se ha visto comprometido en Puerto Rico por su falta de soberanía y por la actual crisis
socioeconómica. Argumentamos que el discurso oficial de que las identidades raciales en Puerto Rico operan de
manera autóctona y separada del marco racial estadounidense ya no es sostenible. Usando el método poco conven-
cional de administrar una pregunta abierta sobre raza en una encuesta a más de mil puertorriqueños, encontramos
una renuencia a identificarse racialmente; la conciencia de una “blancura” normativa que excluye lo puertorriqueño;
y la adopción de categorías federales de los EE. UU. como “hispano” y “latino”. Interpretamos estas tendencias como
evidencia de un estado racial en deterioro, cuyas crisis de soberanía y deuda no solo han erosionado sus alcances
políticos y económicos sino también su capacidad para incidir sobre lo racial (i.e racecraft). [censo, colonializmo,
identidad racial, estado racial, Puerto Rico]
“To them [the United States government],we are Black,an inferior race. Even if we are white or blond, we are
inferior.” This assertion—which suggests that whiteness in
Puerto Rico is always qualified in relation to the empire—
was voiced by one of the more than one thousand Puerto
Ricans who responded to a 2016 survey that asked them to
state their racial identity. The survey was originally designed
to recruit participants for a qualitative study led by Yarimar
Bonilla on the political impact of the Puerto Rican debt
crisis. Race was not the focus of the study, but in the final
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demographic section of the survey, Bonilla (in collaboration
with Godreau) decided to experiment with posing the
question of racial identity in an open-ended format rather
than asking participants to select from a predetermined
set of racial categories. This decision was partly based on
previous critiques about the inappropriate imposition of
US federal racial categories onto the Puerto Rican con-
text (Berkowitz 2001). For example, in the US Census
of 2000, 81 percent of Puerto Rican residents identified
as racially “white.” According to critics, such misleading
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results evidenced, among other things, the incompatibility
between US racial categories and local notions of racial
mixture and whiteness (Duany 2005; Godreau, Lloréns,
and Vargas-Ramos 2010; Lloréns, García-Quijano, and
Godreau 2017; Vargas-Ramos 2005). Responding to this
criticism, the research team used an open-ended question
format, prompting respondents for their racial identity. We
presumed that this would lead respondents to use culturally
specific racial categories, yielding a more nuanced and
complex portrait of racial identification.
After analyzing all responses to our open-ended ques-
tion, we noticed a sharp decrease in the number of partici-
pants who identified as white: 20 percent chose this option,
as opposed to 81 percent on the 2000 US Census. As for
local categories of racial mixture, such as trigueño, jabao, col-
orao, or indio (see Appendix for definitions), only 10 percent
of respondents employed them, even though the use of such
color terms has been well documented in everyday conver-
sations in which people draw distinctions based on pheno-
type (Duany 2005; Godreau 2008; Gravlee 2005). Instead
of using local racial terms to distinguish themselves from
other Puerto Ricans, the overwhelming majority of respon-
dents (69 percent) gravitated toward US federal categories
of race and ethnicity, such as white, Black, Latino/Hispanic,
or Puerto Rican.
At first glance, these results might seem attributable
to the cultural impact of migration or to the growing sup-
port for statehood among Puerto Ricans. After all, people
who spend considerable time in the United States or who
favor Puerto Rico becoming a state might be more willing
to identify with US federal racial categories and to use the
United States, rather than Puerto Rico, as their point of ref-
erence. Yet, although 46 percent of respondents reported
having lived outside Puerto Rico for periods of three years or
more, and although 49 percent of those interviewed favored
statehood, neither migratory experience nor political ori-
entation was statistically correlated with respondents’ use of
federal race categories.Understanding why required further
interrogation.
An additional set of important findings was yielded by
the open-ended question format (often shunned by demog-
raphers and pollsters because it poses considerable chal-
lenges to quantitative analysis). For example, among those
who identified as white, many tended to align themselves
with what we call “qualified whiteness,” using terms like
“white Latino” or “white among Puerto Ricans,” indicating
an awareness of an “unmarked” normative whiteness against
which Puerto Rican whiteness was measured. These kinds
of responses would go undocumented in a survey that solely
used close-ended questions.
In addition, using an open-ended format allowed us to
witness firsthand the apprehension with which Puerto Ri-
cans confronted the question of race. Since the survey was
administered by researchers trained to track both verbal and
nonverbal responses, we were able to document how, when
confronted with the open question of race, many responded
with confusion, silence, stuttering, and even outright resis-
tance to the question, and 16 percent of respondents ei-
ther refused or were unable to answer the question as it was
asked.
Our survey, which was initially designed as a recruit-
ment tool (not as its own source of anthropological data),
also pushed us to think more creatively about how to an-
alyze the quantitative results of our experiment with the
open question of race. Anthropologists have traditionally
shied away from using survey data, but some argue that
these methods will become more common in an era of
“lockdown anthropology” (Long 2020). More than a mere
substitute for practicing ethnography in contexts in which
doing so is deemed impractical, survey methods can be
critically adapted to the kind of questions anthropologists
ask, which differ in both nature, form, and purpose from
those of pollsters and quantitative scientists. They also
require us to learn how to think and write in a “numerate
way” when addressing such questions (Dressler and Oths
2014, 512). Aggregate data can be particularly useful for
finding unexpected patterns and relations that we might not
have otherwise inquired about or organically observed and
to detect shifts that might go otherwise unremarked by our
interlocutors (Handwerker and Borgatti 1998, 530).
Our survey data led us to discover several surprising
trends and nuances in Puerto Rican racial identification. By
running statistical analysis, we were able to ask whether the
patterns we observed could be correlated with other so-
cial variables, such as gender, class, education level, political
party affiliation, migratory history, or geographic location.
The analysis and write-up process was challenging and re-
quired a great amount of retraining and assistance, but it ul-
timately led us to new theorizations of Puerto Rico’s racial
state.
In what follows we make sense of these findings by ana-
lyzing the shifting role of Puerto Rico’s nonsovereign racial
state apparatus. We begin from the anthropological insight
that “the state” is not an ontological reality but a bundle of
relationships, practices, and processes (Abrams 1988;Aretx-
aga 2003; Trouillot 2001). The state is thus perceivable only
through its “effects,” which include the production of racial,
ethnic, and national identities. As Ruth Gilmore and Craig
Gilmore (2008, 144) argue, the production of racial cate-
gories is a key function of statecraft. “Racist ideological and
material practices,” they write, “are infrastructure that needs
to be updated, upgraded, and modernized periodically: this
is what is meant by racialization.” This production of racial
identities, which we describe as the project of “racecraft,” is
thus one way that the state produces and reproduces both its
subjects and itself.
We thus use “racecraft” to refer to the processes, bureau-
cracies, policies, and ideologies that support racialized state
practices in modern nation-states. Racecraft can be funded
by public or para-governmental private entities that partake,
with the support of state agencies and governmental enti-
ties, in constructing and portraying the nation as a bounded
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collectivity with specific racial characteristics. Its identity ef-
fects are part and parcel of how race becomes institutional-
ized via the nation-state, but also of the subjectivities state-
sanctioned practices legitimize and make culturally legible
for people, since the state is both a political and cultural form
(Loveman 2014).
Taking seriously the notion that the production of racial
subjectivities is a critical function of the state (Goldberg
2002; Omi and Winant 2014), and that the production
of “race” is inextricably tied to imperial projects, we
begin by examining the particularities of Puerto Rico
as a nonsovereign racial state, one whose capacity for
race-making has always been compromised by its lack of
sovereignty, but never more so than in the context of its
current economic and political crisis.
Puerto Rico’s compounding and intersecting crises—
which thread colonial governance with austerity politics and
disaster capitalism—have weakened the local state’s ability
to reproduce its usual racial “scripts” (Godreau 2015). The
political and economic crisis of the last decade, combined
with the ongoing “aftershocks” of recent disasters (Bonilla
and LeBrón 2019), has transformed local understandings of
how Puerto Rico fits within the larger racio-imperial forma-
tion of the United States (Bonilla 2020). As a result, the is-
land’s current political and economic bankruptcy is evident
not only in financial indicators and the loss of political au-
tonomy but also in the weakening of the local state’s racial
project, as evidenced by our survey findings.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE PUERTO RICAN RACIAL STATE
Initially a colony of Spain, Puerto Rico came under US ju-
risdiction in 1898 during the Spanish–American War. Its ac-
quisition occurred as the United States sought to assert itself
as an imperial power on the world stage by acquiring terri-
tories as disparate as the Philippines, Guam, and American
Samoa. This expansionist project posed complex legal, eco-
nomic, and social challenges as the United States was forced
to reckonwith the political realities of incorporating colonial
subjects who were deemed racially and culturally inferior
(Rivera-Ramos 2001). To justify the exclusion of territorial
residents from the constitutional protections of a purport-
edly democratic nation, the US Supreme Court established
the legal category of “unincorporated territories”—which
could be acquired without the intent of full incorporation
into the nation and held indefinitely in a de facto colonial sta-
tus (Burnett et al. 2001; Sparrow 2006). Political imagery of
the time reveals how the acquired territories were depicted
as racially inferior and as foreign to the domestic body of the
United States (see Figure 1).
Transformations ushered in by World War II in the
1940s—such as the need to maintain domestic peace and
gain access to cheap labor—combined with local and inter-
national pressures to change the overtly colonial relation-
ship between Puerto Rico and the United States. This led
to the drafting of a constitution in 1952, ratifying the is-
FIGURE 1. 1898 cartoon from the Philadelphia Inquirer of Uncle Sam
holding up the newly acquired possessions of Puerto Rico,Hawaii, Philip-
pines,and Ladrones (Mariana Islands). [This figure appears in color in the
online issue]
land’s political status as a US commonwealth.The new status
became known as the Estado Libre Asociado (Free Associ-
ated State, or ELA)—a euphemistic and contradictory term
that obfuscates Puerto Rico’s status as an enduring colo-
nial state (Torres-Ríos 2018). Under the ELA arrangement,
Puerto Ricans can elect their own governor and other lo-
cal public officials, but they cannot vote for US president or
practice self-determination to challenge their subordinate
political status. Currency, defense, external relations, com-
munications, the postal service, social security, and interstate
commerce remained under the jurisdiction of the US federal
government.
The newly founded ELA enjoyed considerable support
from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration, which imple-
mented health, education, labor, and land reforms in Puerto
Rico through an interventionist andwell-funded state policy.
A key feature of the ELA project was the notion that Puerto
Rico could manage and exercise autonomy over its internal
affairs despite its lack of formal sovereignty.Another key idea
was that Puerto Rico had a distinct cultural patrimony and an
autochthonous “Puerto Rican identity,” which veiled Puerto
Rico’s colonial subjugation to the United States (Álvarez-
Curbelo 1993, 16; Dávila 1997; Kennerley 2003).
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During the 1940s and 1950s, ELA-supporting intellec-
tuals and ideologues such as the anthropologist Ricardo Ale-
gría (1978) officially conceptualized the racial substance out
of which this autochthonous national identity was to be con-
structed as a harmonious mixture of Spaniards, Taíno Indi-
ans, and Africans.When implemented through the state, this
conception, which resembled discourses of mestizaje devel-
oped in Brazil, Colombia, and Cuba,marginalized Blackness
and exalted Hispanic ancestry as a positive influence. At the
same time, local ideologues often silenced or disregarded
the problem of racism, casting it as a “foreign” US issue
and representing Puerto Ricans as mere spectators of the
United States’ “color problem” (e.g., Barbosa 1937; Blanco
1942).
During Puerto Rico’s political transformations in the
1950s, the task of developing the island’s discourse of racial
nationalism fell on the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture
(ICP), a local government institution. Founded in 1955, the
ICP provided an integrated vision of the foundational racial
triad for Puerto Rico. More than “living ancestors” repre-
senting different “ethnic groups” (Segal 1994), “Spanish,”
“Taino Indian,” and “African”were developed by the ICP and
other ELA government institutions as distant heritages that
blended the biological and cultural makeup of all Puerto
Ricans.
Over time, the ICP’s narrative about the three racial
roots and their corresponding cultural contributions and
harmonious blending was disseminated through cultural
programs, festivals, museums, and school curricula, gaining
island-wide acceptance (Godreau 2015). In this framework,
“race” and “culture” became relevant primarily as part of a
national origin story that pre-dated US intervention. Puerto
Rico’s national culture was represented as racially harmo-
nious, made up of subjects who could lay claim to all three
racial heritages but who were also assumed to have whitened
over time through mixture.
This ideology of a whitened mixture went hand in
hand with the government’s denial of racism and “racial
identity” as a matter of public policy worth documenting or
addressing. As a result, the ELA government shunned the
federal census procedure of eliciting information on race
and developed its own local census apparatus that excluded
the race question.Hence, from 1960 to 2000, Puerto Ricans
were not hailed into this compulsory bureaucratic ritual
of racial identification. During this period, the local state
apparatus did not formalize “race” into “bureaucratic identi-
ties.” Although the idea that Puerto Ricans were a mixture
of three races was promoted in educational materials, local
media, and tourism ads, this idea was not applied to a
state-sanctioned classification theme. Local terms for de-
noting degrees of darkness or lightness along the continuum
of mixture (such as trigueño, jabao, colorao, prieto, mulato,
mezcla, café con leche; see Appendix) prevailed in the arena
of interpersonal interactions but were not part of state
practices of identification (Duany 2005; Godreau 2008;
Gravlee 2005).
When race was formalized as a bureaucratic identity, it
was usually within contexts such as military inscription, fed-
eral work, or financial aid applications. Only in these mo-
ments would federal categories of race trump the ELA’s lo-
cal discourse of racial irrelevance, as locals were recruited
into adopting the federal government’s racial categories.
This began to change in 2000, when the local
government—under a pro-statehood administration—
requested that the federal government institute the same
procedures, questions, and categories used in the continen-
tal US Census in Puerto Rico. Far from being a move to
document racial inequality, the request was made by the
Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) in support of its efforts to
make Puerto Rico the fifty-first state of the union. Since its
inception in 1967, the pro-statehood PNP has challenged
the ELA for failing to guarantee the equal treatment of
Puerto Ricans as US citizens. In line with that ideology,
government officials requested that, for administrative
purposes, Puerto Rico be treated as a state by the federal
government, using the same census questionnaire as the fifty
states. The rationale was that this would pave the way for
Puerto Rico’s eventual admission to the union, achieving
what Godreau and others have described as “statistical
statehood” (Godreau, Lloréns, and Vargas-Ramos 2010).
The year 2000 thus marked the first time in fifty years
that Puerto Ricans were asked about their race on the census.
The change, which was not complemented with educational
materials or information about its rationale, was met with
a great deal of apprehension and mistrust because it clashed
with previous color-blind state policies. In fact, two studies
commissioned by the US Census Bureau found that only 53
percent of households returned their census questionnaire
by mail and that the race question was an important factor
in nonresponse (Berkowitz 2001, 16).
In 2000, an election landslide gave control of the local
state apparatus to the opposing political party, the Popular
Democratic Party (PPD), which supports the ELA status.
With that victory, the PPD administration had the oppor-
tunity to reverse its predecessor’s decision to use federal
census procedures, but it did not. We suspect that this was
because the local state could no longer afford its own census
project, due to the developing fiscal crisis.
This inability to finance an independent census fits
within the larger dismantling of the ELA state’s cultural
arm, which had enjoyed abundant financing during the
1940s–1960s to shape the racial representation of its citi-
zens as a color-blind, non-Black, racially mixed population,
distinct from that of the United States. At the beginning of
the twenty-first century, that was no longer the case. The
cultural and educational programming previously sponsored
by the ELA was far from sustainable, as seen in drastic bud-
get cuts to agencies such as the Institute of Puerto Rican
Culture, the headquarters for which is now slated to be-
come a hotel (Meléndez García 2019); the public television
network WIPR, which is up for privatization (Hernández
Mercado 2020); and the public school system, battered by
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the closure of more than four hundred schools, which is
roughly a third of the schools Puerto Rico had before 2016
(Brusi 2020).With the declaration of the debt crisis in 2016,
this debilitated cultural apparatus began to collapse, along
with local roadways, the electric grid, and other forms
of infrastructure, thus making undeniable Puerto Rico’s
colonial status and subordinate racial position (Ficek 2018;
Lloréns and Stanchich 2019).
PUERTO RICO’S BANKRUPT RACIAL STATE
The survey discussed here took place from the summer to
the fall of 2016, a tumultuous time in which Puerto Rico’s
debt crisis was heavily debated in the public sphere. In Oc-
tober of that year, then-governor Alejandro Padilla declared
that the island was in a financial “death spiral” and that its
debts were unpayable (Williams 2016). Having the legal sta-
tus of neither a state nor an independent nation, Puerto
Rico could neither refinance nor default on its debt. The
US Congress barred Puerto Rico from declaring bankruptcy
or receiving any kind of financial bailout. Instead, Congress
passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Eco-
nomic Stability Act (PROMESA), which established an
unelected seven-member Fiscal Oversight Management
Board to oversee local finances and negotiate directly with
creditors.
PROMESA cemented the idea that Puerto Rico had
entered into a new era of governance characterized by a
more overt colonial relationship with the United States
(Goldstein 2016), no longer veiled by the mask of the com-
monwealth status and its promise of offering locals the “best
of both worlds.” These developments coincided with two
US Supreme Court rulings in which the US government
itself argued that Puerto Rico wasn’t really sovereign after
all (Stern 2016).
This realization marked a shift in the public sphere in
which Puerto Rico was suddenly referred to explicitly as a
colony. In a previous era, Puerto Rico’s colonial status was
asserted only in leftist independence circles, but during the
2016 televised gubernatorial debates, all the candidates were
asked how they would resolve Puerto Rico’s colonial status
rather than whether they thought decolonization was still nec-
essary. Notably, 68 percent of those who participated in our
survey said they considered Puerto Rico a colony. As evi-
dence of that colonial condition, many pointed directly to
media coverage of the debt crisis and to the imposition of
PROMESA and the fiscal board.
As Puerto Rico’s colonial and bankrupt status came
sharply into view, many began to proclaim that the ELA was
officially “dead” (Primera Hora 2016). Demonstrators held
performative funerals in which they carried the ELA in an
empty coffin, and artists began depicting the national flag in
black and white instead of the usual red,white, and blue (see
Figures 2 and 3).
During the survey period, Puerto Rico’s colonial re-
lationship with the United States also became increasingly
visible in popular media and public discourse. For example,
FIGURE 2. Local cartoon depicting the “Death of the ELA.”Caption reads:
“Where will we bury it? I don’t know, there’s no money for the funeral.”
(Image courtesy of Kike Estrada) [This figure appears in color in the online
issue]
FIGURE 3. Mural of Puerto Rican flag in San Juan that was changed
to black and white after the declaration of the “death of the ELA.” (Image
courtesy of author) [This figure appears in color in the online issue]
in a popular cartoon by local artist De La Nada (2017; see
Figures 4 and 5), Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United
States was visually likened to that of a master and a slave. In
the cartoon, Puerto Rico is represented as a dark-skinned
slave chained to a wooden post with a sign reading “Colony.”
He is whipped by a light-skinned master. The slave asks to be
granted the same rights as the other fifty states. The Amer-
ican master warns him that this will not necessarily result in
freedom or the right to decide for himself, since he would
then be subject to the desires of fifty other “equal states.”
The Puerto Rican figure responds that he is sure he will have
much in common with the other states. Then the video pans
out to a representation of the slave as the sole brown figure
within a community of fifty other white masters.
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FIGURE 4. Screen shots of “De La Nada - Estadidad e Igualdad” video.
(Image courtesy of Rangely García Colón) [This figure appears in color in
the online issue]
FIGURE 5. Screen shots of “De La Nada - Estadidad e Igualdad” video.
(Image courtesy of Rangely García Colón) [This figure appears in color in
the online issue]
In representing Puerto Rico’s racialized place in the US
political fabric, this cartoon challenges the previous model
of racial mixture and color-blindness promoted by the ELA.
It makes evident that Puerto Ricans are not mere “specta-
tors” of the US color problem, and that they are not located
outside the US empire’s racial formation.
Moreover, this post-PROMESA imagery restages a pre-
vious era of imperial representation in which the US colonial
relationship was depicted as one of patronizing contact with
nonwhites. Representations of the United States as a white
figure charged with disciplining unruly Black children were
common during the early nineteenth century, often drawing
from the symbolic repertoires of minstrelsy. This “pick-
aninny aesthetic” was commonly used to depict US policy
toward the Caribbean and Latin America in the wake of the
Spanish–AmericanWar in 1898 (see Figure 6). It repeatedly
cast colonial subjects as dark-skinned children in need of an
avuncular authority so as to justify US intervention,military
occupation, and even outright acquisition (Pérez 2008).
This trope persists. In interviews conducted as part of
the larger research project discussed here,Bonilla repeatedly
found narratives of the island’s debt crisis that made use of
family metaphors, describing Puerto Rico as a misbehaving
child and the United States as a disciplining paternal figure.
Some participants compared the United States to a parent
who gave their child a credit card that had been maxed out
and then had to be cut up into pieces. Others described
Puerto Rico as a teenager who had crashed their parent’s
car, with the United States representing the parent who had
to take the keys away.
Such infantilizing and imperial representations of
Puerto Ricans were also embedded in responses to our sur-
vey’s open question on race. These representations index a
shift away from the ELA racial regime in which Puerto Ri-
cans were told that they could lay claim to autonomous for-
mulations of mixture and whiteness, outside of the US racial
framework.The following survey findings illustrate the iden-
tity effects of these shifts.
METHOD AND CONTEXT OF THE SURVEY
The data analyzed in this article were obtained through a sur-
vey administered during the summer and fall of 2016 to a
convenience sample of 1,055 participants across nine mu-
nicipalities in Puerto Rico: Aguadilla, Mayagüez, Arecibo,
Ponce, Barranquitas, San Juan, Trujillo Alto, Fajardo, and
Vieques. The research team was composed of five under-
graduate students from the University of Puerto Rico.1
Surveys were conducted in public places, such as shop-
ping centers and town plazas; in government offices, such
as the local DMV (Centro de Servicios al Conductor); and
as part of an exit poll at electoral events (during the 2016
primaries and general elections). These sites were chosen
not only to achieve geographic distribution but also to bring
together residents from a variety of socioeconomic and ed-
ucational backgrounds and political ideologies. In addition,
we found that respondents were more willing to participate
in a survey when approached in these spaces than in spaces
of leisure (such as shopping malls and public plazas), where
many people declined to participate, preferring instead to
enjoy their free time uninterrupted.At both government of-
fices and electoral events, participants were already engaged
in a civic role and seemed more willing to answer questions
related to government and politics.
Survey questions included the following: Have you felt
impacted by the financial crisis? Have you considered mov-
ing outside Puerto Rico?What do you think of the proposed
(at the time) fiscal control board? What political status do
you favor for Puerto Rico? Do you think Puerto Rico is a
colony? A short final section asked for basic demographic in-
formation (age, gender, education level, and racial identity).
Placing the open question for racial identification in the final
demographic section of the survey facilitated respondents
thinking about “race” in the context of previous questions
about the political relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States.2
Most participants were employed (45 percent) or
retired (33 percent), a slight majority were male (53 per-
cent), and most were aged thirty-five to sixty-four (62
percent). Almost half (49 percent) favored statehood, while
others favored the commonwealth status (19 percent) or
independence (14 percent). (see Table 1 for full details on
participants’ demographic profile.)
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FIGURE 6. 1910 Uncle Sam cartoon.
SURVEY FINDINGS
Finding 1: Resistance to the Race Question
Our survey’s first finding was that many respondents were
taken aback by the fact that the question of race was being
posed at all. When asked for their racial identity, most
requested clarification or responded with a long pause.
Students administering the survey were instructed to not
interrupt the pauses or provide explanations and to simply
repeat the question as written, indicating that they were un-
able to provide further context. During the pilot test of the
survey, student researchers quickly noted the most common
reactions to the question, which included prolonged silence
but also nonverbal responses, such as rubbing or touching
the skin of their forearm (a common gesture in Puerto Rico
to indicate race), stuttering and tripping over a response
(from respondents who had not stuttered at any previous
point in the survey), and repeated requests for further
instructions or guidance. For example, respondents would
ask to see the options available, and when told there were no
boxes to check off, they would ask the student researchers to
provide them with the correct answer. Student researchers
developed a coding system to facilitate the tracking of this
metadata (see Table 2).
A considerable number (n = 46) found it impossible
to respond to the question of race or simply refused to an-
swer it (for similar findings, see Duany 2005; Santory-Jorge
et al. 2009). These participants either asked the interviewer
to leave the race question blank (n = 21) or said they did
not know the answer to the question (n = 25). In addition,
a large number of respondents (n = 117) offered answers
that challenged the question’s premise and its intent of cat-
egorizing people into groups. When asked for their racial
identity, many responded that they were members of “the
human race,” that they were “normal,” or that they “get along
with everyone” (me llevo con todo el mundo). Some of these re-
spondents seemed to interpret the question itself as divisive
and racist (see Table 3 for more examples). In the end, 164
people, or 16 percent of the overall sample, were either un-
able to answer or resisted the question.
We interpret this finding as a legacy of a color-blind
ideology produced by the ELA state, which for decades en-
couraged Puerto Ricans to avoid, deflect, or disengage with
questions of race. As others have argued, racial identity has
often been considered taboo or uncomfortable in a context
in which people are encouraged to ignore the issue (Duany
2005).Also, since there are no affirmative action policies and
no justification is provided for the question, some people fear
that the question’s purpose is to discriminate against them
(Berkowitz and Brudvig 2001).
Moreover, because race was eliminated as a category
of government administration for fifty years, Puerto Ricans
are unaccustomed to being asked about their racial identity
in this manner. In contrast, people in the fifty states are
routinely asked to identify their race on everything from
government forms to loan applications and patient-intake
forms at the doctor’s office. The fact that in Puerto Rico
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TABLE 1. Demographic profile of survey participants
Gender n % Employment Number %
male 536 53% employed 454 45%
female 481 47% unemployed 213 21%
missing 1 retired 333 33%
Age Lived in the US
Age 18-24 56 5.5% Yes 459 45%
25-34 98 9.7% No 489 48%
35-44 183 18.0% Come and go 50 5%
45-54 212 20.9% Missing 20 2%
55-64 231 22.8%
65-74 163 16.1% Bilingual




Less than High School 116 11.9% Statehood 506 49%
High-school 272 27.8% ELA 189 19%
Technical Degree 130 13.3% Independence 141 14%
BA 359 36.7% Other 116 11%
Graduate Studies 100 10.2% Don’t know 55 5%
Missing 11 1%
Total number of participants who were asked the question of race: 1,018
TABLE 2. Coding system for nonverbal responses
? Asked clarification on the question
→ Asked for guidance or options from which to choose.
TU Stuttered
GE Bodily gestures (rubbing or touching the body )
SI Prolonged silence
race is seldom asked about in encounters with the local state
apparatus or tracked in most institutions poses a significant
challenge in assessing the role of racism as a determinant
factor in economic opportunities, health outcomes, or
housing discrimination. For example, there are currently
no reliable statistics on whether the racial disparities of the
COVID-19 pandemic, which have been well documented
in the United States, extend to Puerto Rico, since there
is no racial data on COVID-19 testing, hospitalizations, or
fatalities.
When race is asked about in Puerto Rico, it is mostly
in the context of people’s dealings with the federal bureau-
cracy, such as requests for federal aid or the census. In these
and other bureaucratic rituals, racial and ethnic categories
are often conflated, and at times “Puerto Rican,” “Hispanic,”
or “Latino” appear as racial categories, while at other times
racial identity is requested in addition to identification as
Latino.
Puerto Ricans must thus straddle different systems of
classification that variously privilege hypodescent, national
belonging, or phenotypic color in different situations and
contexts (Duany 2005; Gravlee 2005; Roth 2012). As a
result, “race” comes to be perceived as shifting, context-
specific, or unknown (Santory-Jorge et al. 2009). This shift-
ing understanding was evidenced by respondents’ repeated
requests to see the options from which they could choose
an identity and by responses such as “I am Black, but I put
Caucasian on those types of forms.”
Hesitation with the question of racial identity must
also be analyzed in the context of previous colonial
practices. The US Census and other federal forms have
long been recognized as instruments of biopower and
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TABLE 3. Examples of responses classified as “resisting the question”
Everybody is a son of God
I am not racist, I have a
husband and sons of color
Neutral
Evangelical, I am not racist
For me, my race is the best, I
am not a racist and I feel fine
Human (2 instances)
I am a Pacifist
Everybody is the same
I get along with everybody,
we are all human
I am boricua, that is not a
“race” that is a sentiment
I am of everything, trigueña,
white, of everything . . . even
Chinese, in any case. I love
everybody from the heart
BeautifulNormal
I am always the same, look at the racism they have in the
USA
I don’t identify, I appreciate everybody, I don’t
appreciate injustice
Neither white nor Black
I don’t have any problems with whites or Blacks
Races are the same everywhere, there are bad people
of all races
All, I don’t have a race, Puerto Rican, American,
Black, Indian, of everything!
I am of all races
I am not racist
I don’t have one, nobody is different
For them, we are Black, an inferior race. Even if we
are white or blond, we are inferior.
All except Yankee
Here what we have is a horrible racism
governmentality—that is, as instruments that discipline
people into subjectivities that are comprehensible to US
colonial administrators. Puerto Ricans have continually re-
sisted such racially subordinate subjectivities (Duany 2005;
Rodríguez 2000), even when this means redefining racial
boundaries to claim whiteness (Loveman and Muniz 2007).
Hence, we interpret the uneasiness with the question of
race not only as an indication of people’s lack of practice
with bureaucratic racial rituals in Puerto Rico but also as
indicating respondents’ struggle to find where they fit within
a North American system of racial classification—one that
is not so much “foreign” as it is disturbingly familiar.
Finding 2: Qualified Whiteness and Unhesitant
Blackness
As noted above, 16 percent of survey respondents struggled
to state their racial identity. The remaining respondents
provided answers that fell into the following five broad
categories: Puerto Rican, 16 percent; Latino/ Hispanic, 23
percent; white, 20 percent; Black, 10 percent; and mixed
race, 10 percent. A smaller category of “other” (5 per-
cent) includes answers that were uncommon outliers (e.g.,
“Dominican,” “Spanish,” and “Viequense”; see Figure 7.)
From these results, the secondmajor findingwas the low
percentage of people who in our survey chose to identify
as “white” or a variant of white (e.g., jincha, blanca hispana,
clara)—20 percent as compared to the 81 percent and 76
percent registered in the 2000 and 2010 US censuses, re-
spectively. A similar tendency has been found in recent stud-
ies (Santory-Jorge et al. 2009; Vargas-Ramos 2005).3 This
downward trend seems evident even in the official census
results, in which respondents are limited to a narrow set of
categories. The rate of Puerto Ricans identifying as white
in the 2000 census declined from 80.5 to 69 percent in the
Puerto Rico Community Survey for the period 2012–2016,
then further down to 66 percent for the period 2015–2019.4
Scholars have pointed to the importance of migration in
the production of these shifts in racial identity (Roth 2012;
Vargas-Ramos 2014). Migration is not, however, a new phe-
nomenon for Puerto Ricans,who have beenmigrating to and
from the United States since the 1920s, and with increasing
frequency since the 1940s and 1950s. But this has not caused
the number of people who identify as “white” in Puerto Rico
to decline. Quite the contrary. The percentage of people
choosing “white” gradually increased in Puerto Rico: 64.5
percent in 1910, 73.3 percent in 1930, 76 percent in 1940,
79 percent in 1950, and finally 81 percent in 2000 (Vargas-
Ramos 2005, 268). The trend started to change downward
only in 2010,with 75.8 percent identifying as white, shortly
after the economic recession began in 2006 (Caraballo-
Cueto and Lara 2018; Mora, Dávila, and Rodríguez 2017).
Thus, migration alone does not explain tendencies in
our results. Rather than interpreting it as a root cause, we
believe migration is better understood as a corollary effect
of a debilitated state and public-service infrastructure that
fails to meet the needs of its population, forcing them to
move elsewhere. In this new context of state bankruptcy,
the decline in the number of “whites” must also be linked to
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FIGURE 7. Main results distribution. [This figure appears in color in the online issue]
the ELA’s death and the island’s increasingly evident colonial
status. This, in turn, jeopardizes local notions of whiteness
as a legitimate category for people in a vulnerable political
and economic situation.
In fact, those who chose to describe themselves as
“white” in our survey (only 20 percent) did so with a great
deal of hesitation. Almost half those who identified as
white (44 percent) voiced what we describe as a “qualified
whiteness,” stating, for example, that they were “white
Latinos,” “mixed whites,” or “whites from here [Puerto
Rico].” These common qualifications suggest an awareness
of another, competing kind of Anglo-whiteness, implicitly
constructed as normative and not so distant. Some of the
most frequent examples voiced by people in this group were
“white Hispanic,” “white Latina,” and “white Puerto Rican.”
We also, however, came across other, less standard formu-
lations, such as “white, but I am mixed,” “white trigueño,”
and “burnt white.” Other statements included “I am brown
[trigueño], but one puts white on these things [i.e., survey
forms/government forms]”; “White, but I defend Blackness
to the end. I don’t believe in that issue of racism”; and
“White Puerto Rican, although I like Black men.”
In asserting qualified whiteness, respondents often
hesitated, suggesting an awareness that this identity should
not be confused with a normative and unmarked form
of whiteness. Furthermore, we found that most of those
who described themselves as “white” in an unqualified way
tended to be older adults. In a regional study of seventeen
Latin American countries, Telles and Flores (2013, 443–44)
also found that older Latin Americans tend to be more likely
to identify as white compared to their younger conationals.
They speculate young people are more influenced by multi-
culturalism and by popular culture’s impact in valuing Black,
Indigenous, or mixed-race identities, especially because of
their greater exposure to the internet and new technologies.
Even though Puerto Rico was not included in the study, we
concur with their speculation. However, our emphasis on
the role of the racial state also leads us to consider that less
exposure to ELA cultural programs and racial discourses is
a key factor for understanding why “white” is an identity in
decline among the younger generation (twenty-four years
or younger) in Puerto Rico (see Figure 8).
Meanwhile, we observed a different pattern among
those who answered “Black” to the question of race. Unlike
with the white category, the percentage of participants who
identified as Black did not differ drastically from census re-
sults of previous decades. Participants who said they were
Black constituted 10 percent of our general sample, which
is somewhat comparable to the 8 percent and 12 percent of
people who identified as Black in the 2000 and 2010 cen-
suses. Another difference is that we did not find a signifi-
cant correlation between age and identification with Black-
ness. Furthermore, some respondents who described them-
selves as Black qualified their responses with statements such
as “hispana negra,” “Black mixed,” “Black, as they say,” or
“Black trigueño,” but this happened less frequently than with
“whites” (44 percent of whites vs. 19 percent of Blacks). In
addition, interviewers commented that people who said they
Godreau and Bonilla • Nonsovereign Racecraft 11
FIGURE 8. Racial identification as “White” adjusted by age group. [This figure appears in color in the online issue]
were Black answeredwithmore self-assertiveness than other
participants, did not struggle as much with the question, and
were less likely to respond with long pauses, hesitation, stut-
ters, or requests for further instruction.5
We interpret this pattern of “unhesitant Blackness” as
evidence of how—even in a purportedly color-blind soci-
ety where rituals of racial identification have not been rou-
tinized by state agencies—Black residents lack the privilege
of “not seeing” or thinking about racial difference.Moreover,
in a society that has long celebrated ideologies of mixture
and blanqueamiento (state-sponsored “whitening”), asserting
a Black identity requires a conscious rejection of the status
quo (Lloréns 2018). As Hilda Lloréns (2019) argues, Afro–
Puerto Rican communities have affirmed their Blackness in
the face of adversity for centuries.
Finding 3: From Mestizaje to Latinidad
Our third major finding was the absence of terminology in-
dexing the idea of mixture among our respondents.Only 10
percent of respondents identified with the traditional state-
sponsored ideologies of racial mixture or employed local
color terminology that signals mixture (e.g., una mezcla,mu-
lato, jabao, mestizo, trigueño, and so on). In addition, about
a third of all instances in which people alluded to mixture
used this idea as a modifier or qualifier of mainstream racial
or ethnic labels: “negro mezclado,” “blanca, pero mezclada,”
“Latina multicolor,” among others. Moreover, a number of
people said they were a mixture of two races (Black and
white), not the three races that have traditionally been rep-
resented as the pillars of Puerto Rican identity. A few (n =
6) asserted that one could belong only to one of these two
categories, ignoring the idea of racial mixture altogether. For
example, a woman from Aguadilla said, “White because I am
not Black,” and another from Fajardo said, “Black because I
am not white.” Two men from Ponce responded, “I guess
Black . . . you are either white or Black.”
While ELA-era racial ideologies of mixture were sur-
prisingly absent, the category that respondents most widely
deployed as a racial identity was “Latino” or “Hispanic,”
which is how 23 percent of the general sample responded.
In fact, almost half (42 percent) of participants answered
the open question of race using frameworks of ethnicity or
nationality (i.e., Puertorriqueño, Boricua, Latino, Hispano,
Americano, etc.), the most common being pan-national
identities such as Latino or Hispanic. Thus, instead of us-
ing local racial terms such as blanco, trigueño, or negro to
differentiate themselves racially vis-à-vis other Puerto Ri-
cans, respondents used US national frameworks as their
broader point of reference when stating their ethno-racial
identity.
This trend contrasts with previous findings that docu-
ment the use of Latino/Hispanic primarily among Puerto
Ricans based in the continental United States, but with less
frequency in Puerto Rico (Landale and Oropesa 2002, 249;
Roth 2012, 113). In fact, previous studies that document the
use of a wide repertoire of race/color terminology in Puerto
Rico make no mention of people using terms like “Latino”
or “Hispanic” as part of that racial repertoire (Duany 2005;
Godreau 2008; Gravlee 2005; Santory-Jorge et al. 2009).
Some might attribute the shift to a Latino/Hispanic identity
to the experience of migration, yet we did not find the labels
“Hispanic” or “Latino,” or any other racial label for that mat-
ter, to correlate with residence in the United States or with
an experience of migration among survey participants (for
similar findings among nonmigrant Puerto Ricans, see Roth
2012, 101).We did, however, find that age was an important
variable.While those who identified as “white” tended to be
older, the Latino/Hispanic label was used mostly by those
under the age of twenty-five (see Figure 9).
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FIGURE 9. Racial identification as “White” and “Latino” adjusted by age group. [This figure appears in color in the online issue]
This suggests that “Latino” is an identity on the rise and
that new generations of Puerto Ricans (whether they are
in the United States or in Puerto Rico) are viewing them-
selves within the US racial formation and its pan-ethnic
categories. Different factors support this trend. Younger
Puerto Ricans are less likely to be influenced by the ELA’s
officialized ideology of a Puerto Rican cultural identity
unaffected by US colonial intervention. In addition, as the
debt crisis pushed budget cuts to the public agencies once
in charge of reproducing these official racial scripts (such
as the Instituto de Cultura, public television and radio, and
other cultural agencies), the bankrupt racial state has fewer
sites in which to reproduce officialized racial identities and
discourses. Meanwhile, local media have been increasingly
replaced by “canned programming” from conglomerates
such as Univision and Telemundo, which both cater to and
simultaneously reproduce a growing population construed
as “Latino” or “Hispanic” (Roth 2012, 106).
The shift from mestizaje to Latinidad is also facilitated
by how Latinidad functions as a proxy for race in the United
States. As Jonathan Rosa (2019) argues, Latinidad traffics in
“spectrum-based racial logics” that position Latinos in an in-
termediary terrain between Blackness andwhiteness. In fact,
the very same ideologies of racial nonrecognition, Indige-
nous erasure, and anti-Blackness that underpinned the ELA
racial state also underpin the racial project of Latinidad (cf.
Candelario 2011; Jiménez Román 2011).6 All these factors
facilitated the movement of participants, especially young
ones, away from a terminology aligned with mestizaje to-
ward a more US-centered logic of Latinidad. As noted, only
a small number of our survey respondents used terms sig-
naling mestizaje as an identity category.
Meanwhile, across Latin America we also find a turn
away from national discourses of mestizaje and toward other
forms of pluralism. In the late 1980s, there was a drastic
turn in forms of governance and constitutional amendments
in which various Latin American states recognized their so-
cieties not as homogenous entities of mestizo citizens but
as pluri-ethnic. This meant that Indigenous and Black com-
munities could claim a specific collective cultural identity
and the rights attached to this identity. Scholars have un-
derscored that this turn from mestizaje to multiculturalism
occurred in tandem with neoliberal development strategies
that increased inequality and weakened the state’s capacity
to maintain control over its territory. According to Charles
Hale (2002), theweakened state paved theway for neoliberal
legislation that, while granting ethnic autonomy, left Indige-
nous and Black communities to fend for themselves. Tianna
Paschel (2016) further notes that this weakened neoliberal
state also prompted the incursion of parastate international
players into the work of governance (e.g., the United Na-
tions, International Labour Organization, the World Bank,
the Inter-American Development Bank, NGOs, transna-
tional human rights organizations, development specialists).
These organizations upheld ideas of democracy and multi-
culturalism that were largely compatible with Black activists’
demands and with critiques of the state’s homogenizing dis-
course of mestizaje (Paschel 2016).
There are significant differences between Puerto Rico
and the aforementioned challenges to mestizaje as a national
ideology across Latin America. For example, our survey in
Puerto Rico was not preceded by international and national
Black sociopolitical movements, such as those in Colombia,
Brazil, Honduras, and other Latin American countries, nor
by multicultural legislation or constitutional amendments
produced as a result of that militancy. Moreover, the influ-
ence of what Paschel (2016) calls the “global political field”
in this US territory is limited by international actors that
fall under the US government’s purview. Nevertheless, in
Puerto Rico, as in the rest of Latin America, we find links
between a weakened neoliberal state, the diminished promi-
nence of discourses of mestizaje, and people’s increasing
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tendency to adopt transnational ethno-racial identities that
undermine those previously assumed under national state
discourses of harmonious mixture.
Throughout, we find the incursion of external, transna-
tional actors working alongside a weak neoliberal state that
once upheld mestizaje and racial exceptionalism but no
longer has a firm grip over citizens’ racial subjectivities. The
persistence of this common denominator in two very differ-
ent social contexts underscores the impact that a debilitated,
bankrupt state has for racecraft and the construction of racial
identities.
CONCLUSION
This research project began as an experiment to see how
Puerto Ricans would identify racially when the question of
race was posed to them in an open format. We recognized
the widespread consensus among scholars that survey in-
struments such as the federal census are inappropriate for
the Puerto Rican context because they do not allow for the
use of culturally specific categories salient to daily life on
the archipelago. At the same time, we took the challenge of
analyzing a large sample of qualitative answers to our open
question of race, using statistical correlations to detect gen-
eral response patterns, something uncommon in anthropo-
logical research. This unconventional approach uncovered a
trend of steep decline in the number of respondents who
identified as “white,” many of whom were careful to qualify
that identity. We also discovered that a significant number
of respondents were unable to answer the question and that
an overwhelming majority opted for federal (as opposed to
local) categories of race and ethnicity.
We interpret these results as evidence of a nonsovereign
racial state in which federal rituals of racialization override
local ideologies of mixture and color blindness. In other
words, when Puerto Ricans encounter the racial state, they
also encounter the empire. When asked to identify racially,
their tendency is to look within the larger racial-imperial
formation of the United States—despite prevailing ideolo-
gies of mixture or how they might individually imagine their
place in the local pigmentocracy.
Notably, 68 percent of our survey respondents asserted
that they considered Puerto Rico a colony,many of them cit-
ing the debt crisis and US denials of aid as evidence of that
colonial relationship. Such colonial subjectivities also include
an awareness of being part of a racial-imperial formation.
We argue this awareness also points to a local racial state in
decline, one that is ever more unable to shape racial subjec-
tivities or veil its colonial nature.
We predict that these trends will only continue, given
the many “aftershocks” experienced in the wake of Hurri-
cane María (Bonilla and LeBrón 2019). After then-president
Donald Trump minimized the island’s devastation, denied
aid to victims, and sought to repurpose disaster funds from
the island to the construction of a wall along the Mexican
border, Puerto Rico’s place within the imperial racial forma-
tion became hard to deny. In addition, in the wake of the debt
FIGURE 10. 2018 political cartoon of Trump throwing paper towels to
Puerto Ricans. (Image courtesy of Clay Jones) [This figure appears in color
in the online issue]
crisis, the botched hurricane recovery, and the more recent
earthquake “swarm” that has caused hundreds of tremors
along the southern part of the island,migration to theUnited
States has soared, placing Puerto Ricans in greater contact
with United Statesians who interpret their linguistic and cul-
tural practices as nonwhite.
Puerto Ricans are well aware of this heightened imperial
gaze.After Hurricane María, those involved in rescue efforts
reported racism as an obstacle for adequate emergency re-
sponse (Rodríguez-Díaz and Lewellen-Williams 2020). The
prolonged collapse of infrastructure and other basic services
in Puerto Rico afterMaría also revealed, in an embodiedway,
the racialization of Puerto Ricans as colonial subjects (Ficek
2018, 102). When Trump threw paper towels into a crowd
during his visit to hurricane-ravaged Puerto Rico, a carica-
ture of a white, blond president and a dark-skinned Puerto
Rican was used to represent the appalling incident (see
Figure 10).
Our prediction that Puerto Ricans will increasingly un-
derstand themselves as nonwhite within the US schema does
not mean, however, that enduring racial inequalities will dis-
appear.We predict that whiteness will continue to be valued
and protected locally in myriad ways. In fact, as Marisol Le-
Brón (2019) argues, racial segregation is reinforced by state
repression,which is most aggressively deployed when state’s
strategies of economic development fail and create extreme
racial and economic inequality.
Before the hurricanes, neoliberal policies had already
impoverished racialized communities, making Puerto Rico
one of the societies with the most unequal distribution
of wealth in the world (Caraballo-Cueto and Lara 2018;
IEPR 2018, 185). In 2016, after the hurricanes, the Ameri-
can Community Survey revealed considerable disparities be-
tween Puerto Ricans who identified as “Black” and “white”
in terms of household income ($16,961 vs. $24,076), the
percentage of those lacking medical insurance (9 vs. 6 per-
cent), and the percentage of those living in poverty (46 vs.
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44 percent) (Cortés-Chico 2018). Given the racial dimen-
sions of class inequality and the depletion of public services,
we expect such indexes to worsen for communities racial-
ized as Black, whether they are US citizens or migrants, ev-
idencing the dramatically uneven nature of the so-called re-
covery.
In this context, it is no coincidence that activist organi-
zations like La Colectiva Feminista en Construcción and the
Colectivo Ilé have been increasingly pushing for an intersec-
tional analysis of colonialism, class inequality, homophobia,
misogyny, and anti-Black racism (CFC 2017; Colectivo Ilé
2020; Contreras 2019). Lifting the veil of Puerto Rico’s
colonial status has also created new, albeit modest, spaces
for antiracist activism in the form of Afro-descendant or-
ganizations, academic panels, antiracist trainings, cultural
programs, Black beauty websites, and protests in solidarity
with the Black Lives Matter movement. In addition, the
University of Puerto Rico recently established its first Afro-
Diasporic and Racial Studies Programwith support from the
Mellon Foundation. All these were invigorated in the wake
of the murder of George Floyd and demonstrations against
persistent institutional racial violence (Caro González 2020;
Weekly Journal 2020). But as issues of racial inequality
among Puerto Ricans come to the forefront, those who
articulate them are often accused of being oversensitive
or acomplejados (hung-up) (Bonilla-Silva 2010). Moreover,
important media outlets continue to pursue editorial lines
that mock or demean Blackness while dismissing charges
against racism in Puerto Rico, demonstrating that legacies
of the ELA’s blanqueamiento and color-blind ideology still
persist (Abadía Rexach 2020; Toro 2020).
Thus, although recent political shifts have led Puerto Ri-
cans toward a greater understanding of the place they occupy
in the US racial-imperial formation, local racial hierarchies
remain veiled by color-blind ideologies that persist, making
racism difficult to document and denounce. Indeed, the ELA
government is still uninterested in collecting information
about race to track and mitigate racial discrimination or the
disproportionate impacts of recent disasters (or the COVID-
19 pandemic) among racialized communities. At the same
time, our survey results point to an undermining of the na-
tional discourses of Puerto Rican whiteness, mestizaje, and
racial exceptionality that have supported such inaction for
decades.
These and other racialized dynamics forged in the
context of overt nonsovereignty and deep-seated colonial-
ism warrant further research.7 At this time of retrenched
imperialism and state bankruptcy, we must reassess the
previously taken-for-granted notion that Puerto Ricans in
the archipelago overwhelmingly adopt racial identities and
discourses that are distinct from the hegemonic formula-
tions of the North (Duany 2005; Gravlee 2005; Landale and
Oropesa 2002; Rodríguez 2000; Vargas-Ramos 2014). Such
scrutiny must extend beyond personal identity politics,
cultural schemas, and the false consciousness attributed
to Black denial in Afro–Latin America. With increased
neoliberalism debilitating public services and local state
apparatuses across the globe, understanding the role of the
nonsovereign state and its capacity (or lack thereof) for race-
craft is crucial for making sense of how racialized differences
are understood, conveyed, affirmed, or apprehensively felt
in Puerto Rico and across the Americas.
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1. The students involved were part of a six-month NSF-funded re-
search internship organized by Yarimar Bonilla in partnership
with theDepartment of Social Sciences at theUniversity of Puerto
Rico–Arecibo. As part of this project, students learned about
ethnographic and qualitative research methods, participated in
survey design and pilot testing, and carried out focus groups. As
part of the training, students were asked to identify their skin
color on a scale of 1–6, 1 being the lightest and 6 the darkest.
Most rated themselves 2 or 3, while one student classified him-
self as 4. Bonilla identified as a 3. As part of our data analysis, we
searched for correlations between the racial identity of the person
administering the survey and the participant’s responses, but we
could not find statistically significant differences.
2. With this strategy, we followed scholarship that underscores the
importance of framing questions about race in relationship to the
social contexts where race matters (Krieger 2012).
3. In their open survey conducted in 2003, Santory-Jorge and col-
leagues found that 46 percent of their respondents identified as
white (Santory-Jorge et al. 2009). These authors attributed their
results to what they describe as the “observer effect.”They suggest
that interviewers who conducted their open survey were them-
selves Puerto Ricans who could question the whiteness of fellow
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Puerto Rican participants, thereby inhibiting more people from
identifying this way. In contrast, they suggest, people can self-
administer the census, so they might overwhelmingly mark “white
only” in an attempt to “level the field of discussion”with what they
perceive as a distant, powerful, potentially antagonistic, and racist
US federal observer. A similar argument has been made by Love-
man and colleagues in their examination of census practices in
the early 1900s (Loveman et al. 2007). They argue that Puerto
Rican census officers drastically “whitened” the population by ex-
panding the social definition of whiteness in response to a precip-
itous rise in the perceived and actual cost of being seen by Ameri-
cans as nonwhite. These analyses underscore howmethodological
choices have an impact on racial data, as well as the extent towhich
racial identification is influenced by social and political context.
4. US Census Bureau (Table ID DP05, Hispanic or Latino Origin
by Race, Puerto Rico American Community Survey five-year





5. In our survey we could not track or precisely quantify the differ-
ence in reaction time among the different respondents, but this
would be a productive analytical exercise for future researchers.
6. Because Latinidad operates as a form of exclusion, many com-
munities across the Americas question its usefulness as a ban-
ner of identity. This has led some communities in the United
States to call for the “cancellation of Latinidad,” to embrace more
politicized terms such as “LatinX,” or to reject ideologies of mix-
ture, turning instead to the centering of blackness and indigeneity
(Martinez 2019; Salazar 2019).
7. Although we were able to interview very diverse sectors of the
population, future studies using a random samplingmethod rather
than a convenience sample could further confirm response ten-
dencies discussed here. We do not foresee major discrepancies
with the application of these more rigorous sampling methods be-
cause the general tendencies we have described (the reluctance
to racial identification, the declining number of whites, and the
use of a Latino Identity among nonmigrants) have been noted in
other studies referenced here. Besides the sheer numbers, it was
the texture, nuance, and content of the qualitative data we were
able to obtain through our open-ended question that led us to new
theorizations about Puerto Rico’s racecraft.
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APPENDIX
Race and color terms used in Puerto Rico to denote pheno-
type distinctions along a continuum of race mixture (based
on a list of terms provided by Duany 2005, 238; Lloréns,
Quijano, and Godreau 2017, 169).
Examples of responses classified as “resisting the question”
Term Approximate Meaning
Blanco(a) White
Blanquito(a) Literally “little white,” figuratively “elitist,”
“upper class”
Crema/cremita Literally “cream,” beige
Colorao(a) Redheaded, reddish skin
Rubio(a) Blond
Cano(a) Blond, fair-skinned
Jincho(a) Pale-skinned, sometimes used pejoratively
Blanco(a) con
raja
Literally “white with a crack,” white with some
Black features
Jabao(a) Fair-skinned with curly hair
Tringueño(a) Literally “wheat color” or brunette, usually
light mulatto
Moreno(a) Dark-skinned, usually dark mulatto
Mulato(a) Mixture of Black and white
Mestizo Mixture of Black, white, and Indian
Mixto Mixed
Indio(a) Literally “Indian,” brown skin with straight hair
Café con leche Literally “coffee with milk,” tan- or
brown-skinned
Piel canela Literally “cinnamon skinned,” tan- or
brown-skinned
Prieto(a) Dark skin, usually derogatory
Grifo(a) Dark skin with kinky hair, usually derogatory,
largely out of use
De color Euphemism for Black, usually meaning Black
Negro(a) Black
Negrito(a) Literally “little Black,” often used as a term of
endearment
